



STATE OF NEW JERSEY

In the Matter of Robert Wargocki,
Carteret, Police Department

**DECISION OF THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**

CSC DKT. NO. 2024-390
OAL DKT. NO. CSV 08362-23

ISSUED: JULY 23, 2025

The appeal of Robert Wargocki, Police Captain, Carteret, Police Department, 60 working day suspension and demotion, effective August 7, 2023, on charges, was heard by Administrative Law Judge Sarah G. Crowley, who rendered her initial decision on June 11, 2025. Exceptions were filed on behalf of the appointing authority and a reply was filed on behalf of the appellant.

Having considered the record and the ALJ's initial decision, including a thorough review of the exceptions, and having made an independent evaluation of the record, the Civil Service Commission (Commission), at its meeting of July 23, 2025, accepted and adopted the Findings of Fact and Conclusions as contained in the attached ALJ's initial decision and her recommendation to reverse 60 working day suspension and demotion.

As indicated above, the Commission has thoroughly reviewed the exceptions filed by the appointing authority in this matter and finds them unpersuasive. In this regard, the ALJ's determinations are predominantly based on her assessment of the credible evidence in the record. In this regard, the ALJ made explicit credibility determinations. Specifically, the ALJ

Having had an opportunity to carefully observe the demeanor of the witnesses, it is my view that the testimony of Officer Dammann, Officer Kelly and former Chief McFadden were not credible, and their testimony was inconsistent with the facts and the documentation in this matter. All of the testimony had significant inconsistencies and none of the witnesses could identify any rules and regulations that were violated or identify any emergency that the appellant failed to respond to. The significant lapse in time in bringing any charges against the appellant

or any charges against the other officer guilty of the exact same conduct, without any plausible explanation by any of the witnesses, leaves the undersigned wondering what the impetus for bringing these charges over one year later were, much less imposing a sixty-day suspension and a demotion. The testimony from all three officers of the Department was not credible and did not support any of the charges brought against the appellant for failing to report to an emergency. Similarly, there was no evidence to support the allegations that appellant was untruthful in any interviews or was negligent in any reporting.

The Commission acknowledges that the ALJ, who has the benefit of hearing and seeing the witnesses, is generally in a better position to determine the credibility and veracity of the witnesses. *See Matter of J.W.D.*, 149 N.J. 108 (1997). “[T]rial courts’ credibility findings . . . are often influenced by matters such as observations of the character and demeanor of the witnesses and common human experience that are not transmitted by the record.” *See also, In re Taylor*, 158 N.J. 644 (1999) (quoting *State v. Locurto*, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999)). Additionally, such credibility findings need not be explicitly enunciated if the record as a whole makes the findings clear. *Id.* at 659 (citing *Locurto, supra*). The Commission appropriately gives due deference to such determinations. However, in its *de novo* review of the record, the Commission has the authority to reverse or modify an ALJ’s decision if it is not supported by sufficient credible evidence or was otherwise arbitrary. *See N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10(c); Cavalieri u. Public Employees Retirement System*, 368 N.J. Super. 527 (App. Div. 2004). In this matter, the exceptions filed are not persuasive in demonstrating that the ALJ’s credibility determinations, or her findings and conclusions based on those determinations, were arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable. As such, the Commission has no reason to question those determinations, or the findings and conclusions made therefrom.

Since the demotion has been reversed, the appellant is entitled to be immediately reinstated to Police Captain. Additionally, as the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action indicates that the imposition of the 60 working day suspension was held pending any appeal, while he is entitled to have that action removed from his record, he is not entitled to back pay for that period of time. Further, he is entitled to unmitigated differential back pay from August 7, 2023, the effective date of his demotion, to the date of his reinstatement to Police Captain. Moreover, as the appellant has prevailed, he is entitled to reasonable counsel fees pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12*.

This decision resolves the merits of the dispute between the parties concerning the disciplinary charges and the penalty imposed by the appointing authority. However, per the Appellate Division’s decision, *Dolores Phillips v. Department of Corrections*, Docket No. A-5581-01T2F (App. Div. Feb. 26, 2003), the Commission’s decision will not become final until any outstanding issues concerning back pay or counsel fees are finally resolved. In the interim, if it has not already done so, upon receipt of this decision, the appointing authority shall immediately reinstate the

appellant to his Police Captain position.

ORDER

The Civil Service Commission finds that the action of the appointing authority in suspending and demoting the appellant was not justified. The Commission therefore reverses those actions and grants the appeal of Robert Wargocki.

The Commission orders that the appellant be reinstated to his position of Police Captain and receive unmitigated differential back pay from August 7, 2023, the effective date of his demotion, to the date of his reinstatement to Police Captain.

Additionally, the Commission orders that counsel fees be awarded to the attorney for the appellant pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.12*. An affidavit of services in support of reasonable counsel fees shall be submitted by or on behalf of the appellant to the appointing authority within 30 days of issuance of this decision.

Pursuant to *N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.10* and *N.J.A.C. 4A:2.12*, the parties shall make a good faith effort to resolve any dispute as to the amount of back pay and counsel fees. However, under no circumstances should the appellant's reinstatement to Police Captain be delayed pending resolution of any potential back pay or counsel fee dispute.

The parties must inform the Commission, in writing, if there is any dispute as to back pay or counsel fees within 60 days of issuance of this decision. In the absence of such notice, the Commission will assume that all outstanding issues have been amicably resolved by the parties and this decision shall become a final administrative determination pursuant to R. 2:2-3(a)(2). After such time, any further review of this matter shall be pursued in the Superior Court of New Jersey, Appellate Division.

DECISION RENDERED BY THE
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON
THE 23RD DAY OF JULY, 2025



Allison Chris Myers
Chairperson
Civil Service Commission

Inquiries
and
Correspondence

Nicholas F. Angiulo
Director
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Attachment



State of New Jersey
OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

INITIAL DECISION

OAL DKT. NO. CSV 08362-23

AGENCY DKT. NO. 2024-390

**IN THE MATTER OF ROBERT WARGOCKI,
BOROUGH OF CARTERET POLICE
DEPARTMENT.**

Leonard C. Schiro, Esq., for appellant, Robert Wargocki (Mets Schiro McGovern
Manetta & Milewski,, LLP, attorneys)

H. Thomas Clark, Esq., for respondent, Borough of Carteret Police Department
(Apruzzese, McDermott, Mastro & Murphy, P.C., attorneys)

Record Closed: May 29, 2025

Decided: June 11, 2025

BEFORE SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ:

STATEMENT OF CASE AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The appellant, Robert Wargocki (Wargocki or appellant), is employed as a police captain with the Borough of Carteret Police Department (Department). The appellant was given a sixty-day suspension and a demotion due to an incident that occurred on July 13, 2021. He was charged with incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties; conduct unbecoming a public employee; neglect of duty; and violation of Carteret Police Department Rules and Regulations: 3:1.4; 3:1.6 and 4:2.2. The Preliminary Notice of

Discipline was issued on October 27, 2022, and the Final Notice of Disciplinary Action was issued two years after the incident on July 20, 2023. The charges stem from an allegation that the appellant failed to respond to an emergency and the subsequent reporting relating to a meaningful review of a use of force charge against another officer and the ensuing investigation. The appellant filed an appeal, and the matter was transmitted to the Office of Administrative Law as a contested matter on January 12, 2024. N.J.S.A. 52:14B-1 to -15; and N.J.S.A.52:14F-1 to -13. The matter was heard before the undersigned on March 19, 2025, and March 20, 2025, and the record closed after written submissions were received by the parties on May 29, 2025.

TESTIMONY AND FINDINGS OF FACT

Michael Dammann (Dammann) is a captain for the Department. He is familiar with the appellant as they attended the academy together. He explained that the investigation into the charges against Wargocki stemmed from another investigation relating to a meaningful review of the failure of another officer to have his body cam on and an excessive force allegation against that officer. There was a report prepared by Officer Kelly which stemmed from that investigation that mentions "two officers in the parking lot," when another officer was leaving the building to respond to a call from Officer Lopez-Santos (Santos or Lopez-Santos) who was in the field in pursuit of a suspect. Dammann testified that the radio call from Santos was a "hot call" and everyone in the precinct was supposed to respond to this call.

Dammann was questioned about what constitutes a "hot call," and who determines if it is a "hot call." He was asked to review the over eighty pages of rules and regulations as well as R. 3:1.4, R. 3:1-6 and R. 4:2-2 which were cited in the disciplinary notice and to identify the rule where this protocol is set forth or an emergency call is defined. Dammann was unable to identify any policies or point out what had been violated. He maintained that everyone knows this rule but could not describe what makes something a "hot call," who determines if there is a "hot call," and significantly, what is the protocol if a hot call occurs. He did not indicate that there was any issue in his initial report.

Officer Dammann testified that he heard a scream over the radio when Lopez was out in the field, and everyone in the precinct should have responded. When questioned about the scream that he heard, he conceded that Lopez-Santos advised that there was no scream, and he effected an arrest within minutes of arriving on the scene. Officer Dammann was provided with a copy of the transcript from the call and could not identify any reference to a call for back up or any type of emergency. He was also not sure if all of the officers responded to the call and noted that the other officer in the parking lot with Wargocki did not respond to the call. He also testified that this other officer received no discipline and there was no investigation into his conduct. Dammann could not explain why there was no investigation or charges against the other officer for the exact same conduct from Wargocki which resulted in a sixty-day suspension and demotion.

Officer Dammann identified Exhibit 1 and 2, consisting of 100 pages of the Rules and Regulations of the Carteret Police Department. He could not identify any rule or regulation that had been violated. On cross-examination, the appellant's counsel provided a copy of the Standard Operating Policies for the Carteret Police Department which addressed "Call Response Guidelines." The policies describe emergencies as those "involving imminent danger of death," or "serious injury," "ongoing crime/offenses involving violence," an "officer in trouble call" or a "request for an emergency response." Hearing an unconfirmed scream on the radio is not identified in these SOPs, nor is there a protocol which would require all officers in the precinct to respond to particular calls. Dammann could not identify any part of the transcript of the very short call which would indicate an "officer in trouble" or a request for an emergency response. Moreover, he acknowledged that the officer in the field denied that there was any scream and indicated that he effected a routine arrest within minutes of the call.

Chief Dennis McFadden (McFadden) was employed by the Borough of Carteret until his retirement in January of 2025. He was the chief of police at the time of his retirement and had also served in roles as captain, lieutenant, and deputy chief prior to becoming the chief of police, a position which he held for six years. He discussed the Department and different roles including Internal Affairs (IA). He is familiar with the IA investigation that was conducted of the appellant in connection with the within charges. He reviewed the report that Captain Dammann prepared and made the determination of

what discipline to impose. He testified that after a scream was heard on the radio, that all officers on duty should have reported to the scene. He could not identify any specific rules or regulations that had been violated or the protocol for such a situation. Moreover, he could not identify any rules which defined an emergency or "hot call." After reviewing the transcript of the call, McFadden agreed that the officer did not call for backup and no one called for help. He also conceded that the officer on the call reported that he did not call for backup and there was no scream.

On cross-examination, McFadden testified that John Kelly (Kelly), deputy chief, never reported the incident as violating any rules or protocols. He maintained that Kelly had been guilty of neglect of duty for not reporting the violation and received a minor disciplinary infraction. It was unclear why the charges against Wargocki and Kelly were not brought for over a year. In addition, McFadden could not explain why no investigation or charges were brought against the other officer in the parking lot who was guilty of the exact same conduct. McFadden conceded that the other officer was guilty of the exact same infraction and had no explanation as to why he received no discipline. Chief McFadden was questioned about the emergency which appellant did not respond to, and the protocol for responding to an emergency. He could not identify in the transcript any such emergency call, nor could the Chief identify any rules or regulations that required all officers on duty to report to an incident when an unidentified scream is heard on the radio. McFadden also confirmed that shortly after they disciplined Kelly, he was promoted.

Deputy Chief John Kelly works for the Department. He was a patrolman, sergeant, lieutenant and is currently the deputy chief of police. He was on duty when Lopez was heard on the radio. He testified that they heard a scream, so they all responded. He prepared a report due to his body cam coming off, which states that he saw Wargocki and another officer in the parking lot when he was leaving the building to respond to the call. He testified that he never said anything about them needing back up for Lopez-Santos. His report related to an incident where there was no body cam and it had nothing to do with Wargocki or the other officer in the parking lot. He did not identify who the officers were in the parking lot in his report and had varied and inconsistent reasons for not naming them in his report.

Kelly described the call from Lopez-Santos as a "hot call" and that everyone on duty was to respond when there was such a call. Deputy Chief Kelly could not describe what a "hot call" was or why hearing a scream in the background of a radio from someone in the field would categorize this call as a "hot call." He also could not identify any rules or regulations which described or even mentioned a "hot call" or any protocols which addressed such a requirement. He was shown the transcript from the radio transmission of the so-called "hot call" and there was no communication relating to the need for back up or any type of emergency. When he arrived at the scene, Lopez-Santos was effectuating an arrest and there was no emergency. Lopez-Santos later stated that there was no scream and no call for back up.

Due to a problem with his body cam, Kelly had to submit a report to Wargocki about when and why the body cam came off. He was interviewed by Dammann about the incident. It was during this investigation that he was asked about the officers in the parking lot. He advised Dammann that it was Wargocki and Moody. When he was asked by Dammann why he did not put their names in the report, he indicated in the interview "that he did not have a good reason." He later indicated that it was because Wargocki was his superior, so he was not comfortable naming him in his report. He testified that when they questioned Lopez-Santos about the scream, he indicated that no one screamed, and he did not call for backup. He testified that he never told Wargocki or Moody when he passed them in the parking lot that there was a "hot call" or that an officer called for backup. The transcript of the call did not indicate a scream or a call for back up. When Wargocki followed up with Lopez-Santos, he indicated that he had arrested the suspect and this all happened within two minutes of the call.

Kelly testified that he ultimately received a minor disciplinary infraction for not reporting Wargocki and Moody for this conduct. In addition, he reviewed the reports that Wargocki prepared in connection with the administrative review of the body cam, as well as the interview of him in connection with his failure to respond to the call. He testified that the timing was off in the report regarding the body cam and that Wargocki should have corrected this minor error. He also testified that when Wargocki was interviewed about the charge of not responding to an emergency, he was not truthful in his response. He did not specify the statement that he gave over a year later that was untruthful. Based

on the testimony as well as a thorough examination of the transcripts, the undersigned could not identify any untruthful statements by Wargocki or any significant errors that should have been corrected.

FINDINGS OF FACT

The resolution of the claims made by the appellant requires that I make a credibility determination regarding the critical facts. The choice of accepting or rejecting the witnesses' testimony or credibility rests with the finder of fact. Freud v. Davis, 64 N.J. Super. 242, 246 (App. Div. 1960). In addition, for testimony to be believed, it must not only come from the mouth of a credible witness, but it also must be credible. It must elicit evidence that is from such common experiences and observation that it can be approved as proper under the circumstances. See Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546 (1954); Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 1961). A credibility determination requires an overall assessment of the witnesses' story considering its rationality, internal consistency and the way it "hangs together" with the other evidence. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718,749 (1963). A fact finder is free to weigh the evidence and to reject the testimony of a witness, even though not directly contradicted, when it is contrary to circumstances given in evidence or contains inherent improbabilities or contradictions which alone, or in connection with other circumstances in evidence, excite suspicion as to its truth. In re Perrone, 5 N.J. 514. 521-22 (1950). See D'Amato by McPherson v. D'Amato, 305 N.J. Super. 109, 115 (App. Div. 1997).

Having had an opportunity to carefully observe the demeanor of the witnesses, it is my view that the testimony of Officer Dammann, Officer Kelly and former Chief McFadden were not credible, and their testimony was inconsistent with the facts and the documentation in this matter. All of the testimony had significant inconsistencies and none of the witnesses could identify any rules and regulations that were violated or identify any emergency that the appellant failed to respond to. The significant lapse in time in bringing any charges against the appellant or any charges against the other officer guilty of the exact same conduct, without any plausible explanation by any of the witnesses, leaves the undersigned wondering what the impetus for bringing these charges over one year later were, much less imposing a sixty-day suspension and a demotion. The

testimony from all three officers of the Department was not credible and did not support any of the charges brought against the appellant for failing to report to an emergency. Similarly, there was no evidence to support the allegations that appellant was untruthful in any interviews or was negligent in any reporting.

Accordingly, I **FIND** the following as FACT:

1. An investigation into another officer's lack of body cam in connection with an excessive force claim resulted in the issuance of a report that appellant and another officer were seen in the parking lot when he was leaving for an alleged emergency call.
2. The report did not name the officers or indicate that there was any problem with seeing them in the parking lot. The officer did not advise them that there was an emergency call from officer Lopez-Santos.
3. The respondent alleged that the officers in the parking lot should have responded to an emergency call that came in over the radio, yet no emergency or protocol in the event of an emergency call could be identified.
4. The officer in the field reported that there was no scream, no emergency and he did not call for back up.
5. The transcript of the call entered into evidence demonstrated that there was no call for back up, no emergency and a routine arrest was conducted within minutes of the call.
6. The respondent could not identify any specific policy or protocol regarding the call for backup, conduct during an emergency or any description of an emergency or "hot call."
7. Over one year later, disciplinary charges were brought against the appellant for failing to respond to an emergency, and a minor error in his administrative review report, and untruthfulness in the ensuing investigation over a year later.

8. There was no investigation and no charges brought against the other officer that was with the appellant who likewise did not respond to the call. There was no explanation provided as to why no charges were brought against him for the exact same conduct.
9. The respondent failed to demonstrate any misrepresentations, neglect or untruthfulness by the appellant.

LEGAL ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

The Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to -12.6, governs a public employee's rights and duties. The Act is an important inducement to attract qualified personnel to public service and is liberally construed toward attainment of merit appointments and broad tenure protection. Essex Council No. 1, N.J. Civil Serv. Ass'n v. Gibson, 114 N.J. Super. 576 (Law Div. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 118 N.J. Super. 583 (App. Div. 1972); Mastrobattista v. Essex Co. Park Comm'n, 46 N.J. 138, 147 (1965). The Act states that State policy is to provide appropriate appointment, supervisory and other personnel authority to public officials so they may execute properly their constitutional and statutory responsibilities. N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(b). To carry out this policy, the Act authorizes the discipline and termination of public employees.

N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a) provides that a public employee may be subject to major discipline for various offenses. The burden of proof is always on the appointing authority in disciplinary matters to show that the action taken was justified. N.J.S.A. 11A:2-21; N.J.A.C. 4A:2-1.4(a). The employee's guilt of the charge(s) must be established by a preponderance of the competent, relevant and credible evidence. Atkinson v. Parsekian, 37 N.J. 143 (1962); In re Polk License Revocation, 90 N.J. 550 (1982). Precisely what is needed to satisfy the standard must be decided on a case-by-case basis. The evidence must be such as to lead a reasonably cautious mind to the given conclusion. Bornstein v. Metropolitan Bottling Co., 26 N.J. 263, 275 (1958). Preponderance may also be described as the greater weight of the credible evidence in the case, not necessarily dependent on the number of witnesses, but having the greater convincing power. State v. Lewis, 67 N.J. 47, 49 (1975). Credibility, or, more specifically, credible testimony, in

turn, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself, as well. Spagnuolo v. Bonnet, 16 N.J. 546, 554–55 (1954). Both guilt and penalty are redetermined on appeal from a determination by the appointing authority. Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571 (1980); West New York v. Bock, 38 N.J. 500 (1962).

The appellant has been charged with failure to respond to an alleged emergency in July of 2021, not being truthful in an IA interview conducted one year after the incident, and failure to correct a minor error in a meaningful review report, in violation of:

1. Incompetency, inefficiency or failure to perform duties in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(1)(1);
2. Conduct unbecoming a public employee in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(6)
3. Neglect of duty in violation of N.J.A.C. 4A:2-2.3(a)(7)
4. Violation of the following Carteret Police Department Rules and Regulation

In this matter, the respondent seeks to impose a sixty-day suspension and to demote the appellant as a result of an incident that occurred on July 13, 2021, which involved an allegation that there was a call for help from an officer and the appellant failed to respond to the scene as required by the rules. The witnesses for the respondent claim this was a well-known policy and an egregious violation. However, none of the witnesses could point to any rule, regulation or policy which was violated. Moreover, there was no evidence that there even was any such emergency. The transcript from the recording of the officer in the field indicates that there was no such emergency, and a routine arrest occurred within two minutes of the call. In addition, the officer with appellant at the time, who likewise did not respond to this alleged emergency, received no discipline, and no investigation in his conduct was even conducted.

The respondent claims that the facts surrounding the event were so egregious that they merited a demotion and a sixty-day suspension. However, they did nothing about this alleged egregious conduct for over one year, and the report which mentions seeing two officers in the parking lot does not name the officers or indicate there was any problem

with this conduct. The respondent provides no explanation for the delay, no explanation for the failure to discipline the other officer, and fails to identify any specific rule, regulation or policy which was violated. The respondent provides all the policies, rules and regulations for the Department amounting to approximately 100 pages but none of the rules and regulations mention protocols for an emergency or "hot call," nor could anyone provide a description of what constitutes such an event. Yet, the introduced a Standard Operation Procedure from the Carteret Police Department which specifically addresses call response protocols and a scream allegedly heard by someone over a radio, falls fatally short of constituting an emergency or a call for backup, and even if it did, the officer on site indicated there was no such scream and no call for backup.

The charges relating to a failure to correct a minor timing error in a report were not established by a preponderance of the evidence. Likewise, there was no credible evidence or testimony to support the allegation untruthfulness in an interview regarding this incident which occurred a year after the alleged infraction.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Accordingly, I **CONCLUDE** that the respondent failed to prove any of the charges by a preponderance of the evidence, and they are all therefore **DISMISSED**. I further **CONCLUDE** that the demotion of the appellant based upon these charges was improper and the appellant should be retroactively returned to his rank and the charges and any suspension relating to them be **DISMISSED**.

I hereby **FILE** my initial decision with the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION** for consideration.

This recommended decision may be adopted, modified or rejected by the **CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION**, which by law is authorized to make a final decision in this matter. If the Civil Service Commission does not adopt, modify or reject this decision within forty-five days and unless such time limit is otherwise extended, this recommended decision shall become a final decision in accordance with N.J.S.A. 52:14B-10.

Within thirteen days from the date on which this recommended decision was mailed to the parties, any party may file written exceptions with the **DIRECTOR, DIVISION OF APPEALS AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS, UNIT H, CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 44 South Clinton Avenue, PO Box 312, Trenton, New Jersey 08625-0312**, marked "Attention: Exceptions." A copy of any exceptions must be sent to the judge and to the other parties.

June 11, 2025

DATE



SARAH G. CROWLEY, ALJ

Date Received at Agency:

Date Mailed to Parties:

SGC/lam/onl

APPENDIX

WITNESSES

For appellant

None

For respondent

Michael Dammann

John Kelly

Dennis McFadden

EXHIBITS

For appellant

C-1 Carteret Emergency Response Policy

C-5 Complete CAD of the call

C-17 Body Camera SOP

For respondent

R-1 Carteret Rules and Regulations (2022)

R-2 Carteret Rules and Regulations (2021)

R-3 List of Power DMS/Wargocki

R-5 IA Report October 5, 2022

R-6 IA Report October 20, 2021

R-7 Email re: BWC failure

R-8 Email re: no BWS

R-9 Email from J.K. re: BWC failure

R-11-R-17 Videos and transcripts

R-18 IA witness Acknowledgement

R-19 CAD Report

R-20 Email notice to R.W. of IA

R-21 Email re: time off on BWC

R-22 Email

R-23 IA investigation review sheet